social psychologist Irving Janis, arguing (as he often did) that group dysfunction is *not* inevitable, and the book reminds us that group dysfunction can be minimized through the use of various leadership techniques (see especially pp. 32–34).

Of course, as with any short book, there are things that might have been added. For instance, it might have been nice to see the 2011 decision to strike Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad, Pakistan, compound using a helicopter raid examined through this lens. The Bill Clinton administration—often paralyzed by too much information and complexity and too little decisiveness on the part of its leadership—also seems like a prime candidate for deeper analysis from the authors' polythink perspective. Any analysis of these kinds of dynamics is vulnerable as well to the accusation that the symptoms, causes, and consequences of any group phenomenon are hard to disentangle in retrospect without any "fly on the wall" presence (see in particular pp. 11–34). Nevertheless, the authors' analysis of the decision making during the run-up to September 11, 2001 is especially strong, and it provides for the first time a convincing attempt to put the 9/11 Commission Report into the kind of theoretical categories that a scholar of foreign policy analysis would understand and appreciate (pp. 35–65). The analysis also rightly concedes that there were elements of groupthink at the outset of the Iraq war, while arguing that polythink became evident several years later on. Overall, the authors convincingly trace the fault lines present within U.S. government, and provide an indispensable primer on polythink that is likely to be utilized in an array of courses on foreign policy analysis and international relations in general.

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Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Multilateral Intervention by Stefano Recchia. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2015. 296 pp. $39.95.

What is the role of civil-military relations in the pursuit of multilateralism? *Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors* wades into a large body of literature on multilateralism, arguing that a central reason countries such as the United States value multilateral approval for military operations is that it affords comfort to military leaders who want to avoid open-ended and costly unilateral uses of force. Civilian leaders are often forced to seek multilateral approval in order to assuage their generals, necessary partners in achieving their foreign policy goals.

The book provides an excellent synthesis of ideas from the study of bureaucratic decision making, organizational behavior, intra-agency politics, and foreign policy decision making, creating a coherent theory of the bene-fits of multilateral approval. Building on classic work on the military,

Stefano Recchia argues that military leaders are by nature relatively conservative about the use of force, and this pragmatism sometimes constrains more intervention-oriented civilian leaders. Civilian "interventionist hawks," as Recchia labels them, are often motivated by the promulgation of liberal democratic ideals but are not intrinsically driven to seek multilateral approval. In fact, for reasons of autonomy and expediency, they would often rather bypass multilateral channels. However, multilateralism appeals to military leaders who desire low-cost commitments and enduring burden sharing. Multilateral coalition building helps achieve this by garnering the cooperation of foreign partners and by helping convince Congress to support the military and the mission.

Recchia develops a number of auxiliary, conditional hypotheses that outline the circumstances under which military leaders' preferences are likely to be most influential and important. These include the claim that the military, while perhaps not playing an agenda-setting foreign policy role, can often exercise veto power over applications of force, particularly when civilian politicians are divided and in cases in which the national interest is not directly threatened. In such cases, multilateral approval becomes nearly essential in order to limit the military's "liability" (p. 54).

Although the book's argument builds on theories from multiple traditions, Recchia is perhaps guilty of overreach when it comes to distinguishing his approach from alternative theories. Specifically, Chapter 1 compares Recchia's civil-military centric approach to other explanations of the value of multilateralism, including work that claims that multilateralism is primarily a means of rallying domestic support, assuaging foreign allies, or overcoming legislative opposition. These alternatives are dismissed for a variety of reasons. However, none appears to be mutually exclusive relative to the civil-military approach. Indeed, many are more complementary than depicted here. Juxtaposing one's argument with existing explanations is perhaps a useful strategy for justifying one's contribution, but here the jettisoning of related arguments appears hasty and artificial. This critique is largely stylistic, though, and should not detract from the overall theoretical contribution of Chapters 1–2.

Chapters 3–5 examine the civil-military case for multilateralism through a series of "structured, focused" case comparisons (p. 63). Chapter 3 analyzes decision making surrounding the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti—a case that, while not activating a sense of threat to national security, gave pause to military leaders who feared an open-ended engagement. In response, civilian leaders sought United Nations (UN) Security Council approval in order to create a postintervention peacekeeping force that would limit the exposure of the U.S. military. Chapter 4 focuses on intervention in Bosnia from

1992 to 1995, likewise detailing how U.S military leaders expressed reservations about military involvement, effectively "vetoing" unilateral intervention and forcing civilian leaders to see UN and NATO cooperation (p. 108). Chapter 5 further illustrates the military's role in pushing for multilateral cooperation, even at "significant cost to the United States" in terms of delay and loss of operational autonomy (p. 147). These chapters are excellent examples of how to leverage primary and secondary sources against theoretical expectations in order to create compelling and well-researched case narratives; they represent a tremendous amount of research and attention to detail.

Chapter 6 provides a nice counterpoint to the previous cases in that it documents why the U.S. military failed to prevent more unilateral action during the 2003 Iraq War. Recchia points to the organizational culture of the U.S. Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld, as well as the larger context of the post–September 11 security environment, to explain the deference to hawking political leaders in this case. Perhaps more importantly, Recchia shows that many senior military officials shared the general preference for multilateralism prior to the Iraq war, even if their concerns did not ultimately result in the George W. Bush administration operating with a formal UN Security Council mandate. This chapter thus helps establish the limits of military preferences in the foreign policy process without undermining the broader thesis of the book.

Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors is a nice addition to the literature on the political motivations for multilateralism, and it will be of significant interest to students of civil-military relations, U.S. foreign policy, and humanitarian intervention.

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Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right by Seth Dowland. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. 280 pp. $45.00.

Moving beyond party politics, Seth Dowland articulates the recurring importance of family politics in the American political arena. While many who study the Christian right start with its more obvious rise in the 1970s, Dowland looks back to the history of values in American politics and the ownership of family values rhetoric by the Christian right starting in the 1960s. The main premise of the book is that while individual issues come and go from the political arena, family values have become (p. 9) and remain (p. 228) an important component of American politics.